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In practice, land turnovers on the basis of decrees 10- 90 and 11-90 have proceeded at a pace far
slower than what COSEP would like to see. Still, it has been more than enough to generate a
widespread sense of insecurity in the countryside, leading to protests, farm seizures by members
of the Association of Rural Workers (ATC), and a drop in cultivated area by peasants reluctant to
plant on lands they fear will soon be taken away. Repeal of the decrees was a principal demand of
workers in the general strike that paralyzed the country in July. Meanwhile, the National Union of
Farmers and Cattle Ranchers (UNAG), which brings together the country's small- and mediumscale agricultural producers, is protesting the government's macroeconomic policies. The export
stimulation strategy involves exchange, credit, fiscal and price policies designed to enhance the
profitability of export production, but at the expense of producers tied to the domestic market,
for the most part peasants. In this setting, UNAG fears that banks and private lenders will be able
to foreclose on those cooperatives and individual peasant holders which cannot pay their debts.
The macroeconomic strategy may very well stimulate exports, but threatens to ruin the domestic
sector in the process, says UNAG. Peasant producers account for nearly 100 percent of domestic
food production. Export crop production, on the other hand, is principally in the hands of large
landholders and agro-businesspersons. In terms of social classes, the export stimulation strategy
means favoring large landowners, business and the rural rich, at the expense of peasants and
the poor, UNAG argues. And, of course, the government's economic policies do not differentiate
between pro-Sandinista peasants and ex- contra peasants, who now find themselves facing a
common threat. Resentment for the Oligarchy In a sense, the contras are jumping from the frying
pan into the fire by disarming and becoming peasants once again. Their demobilization has injected
the contras into a complex rural situation already brimming with explosive conflicts of interest.
Given this rural minefield, it is not surprising that the government has been unable to fulfill its
promises to the former contras. Although up to one-fifth of the national territory was promised for
the development poles, only about 25,000 acres of land have actually be granted to date, benefitting
a few hundred individuals. Both UNAG and the RN-OC have presented the Chamorro cabinet
with detailed proposals for distributing unused state and private lands to the demobilized contras
and landless peasants. One obstacle is that the government wants to return the state units intact to
private concerns since distributing them as parcels to peasants would mean breaking up efficient
large-scale production units. Politically, it is fearful of provoking a backlash from the right if it
distributes state properties to peasants. With the government's promise of land unfulfilled, the
contras began to lose patience by July. "There is a lot of unrest, frustration and contradictions,"
warned one contra leader, Eleazar Rivera ("El Colombiano"). "We don't really want to destabilize
this government, but some think differently since we've been waiting for three months for an
answer and we have received nothing." From virulent anti-Sandinismo, the contras began to express
class-based resentment for the new authorities in Managua, whom they accused of representing
the old landed oligarchy a resentment indelibly stamped in the minds of the Nicaraguan peasantry
from before the Sandinista period. As tensions mount throughout the countryside, two contradictory
tendencies are developing: On the one hand, restless, land-hungry contras who for years had known
nothing but war and and hatred for anything Sandinista, turn their attention towards lands granded
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to peasants by the Sandinistas, in particular the cooperatives. On the other hand, the contras find
themselves inexorably drawn into conflict with the government, and in the same boat with the rest
of the peasantry vis-a-vis government policies. Eroding the FSLN Base In many of the politically
motivated land takeovers, it is clear that right-wing factions within UNO found an opportunity to
manipulate the contras and their plight for their own political purposes. These extremist elements
have targetted the cooperatives and state farms as important bastions of the FSLN's social base.
Most coop members belong to the UNAG, while state farm workers are affiliated with the ATC.
Although these two organizations are not formally linked with the FSLN they bring together the
majority of the rural population that benefitted from ten years of agrarian reform. Thus the UNO
right-wing sees weakening the cooperative and state lands, and those that work them, as a way to
erode the FSLN's social base. In one highly publicized case, some 150 people took over the Carlos
Fonseca agricultural cooperative in La Concha, to the south of Managua. According to findings
by a government commission sent to investigate, only 16 of the occupiers were actually landless
peasants from the area. The rest were UNO activists, contras trucked in from other regions, and
local merchants in alliance with the pre-1979 owners of the land. Vice President Godoy had arrived
a few days before the takeover, and those interviewed by local reporters expressed support for
Godoy and dislike for the Sandinistas as the reasons for their participation in the takeover, rather
than economic motives. The La Concha cooperative members denounced the take- over as part of a
strategy drawn up by the Godoy group to dismantle the area's 11 cooperatives and return the lands
to either their pre-1979 owners or to landless peasants who are loyal to UNO, and thus break the
political hegemony that the FSLN enjoys in the largely pro-Sandinista area. In other parts of the
country, UNO municipal councils (local governments) and mayors have been organizing the land
takeovers and provocations. In their efforts, the UNO militants stir up old resentments, blame the
cooperatives for the lack of land, and promise rewards to incite restless ex-contras into targetting
the cooperatives. "The cooperatives have had the land for a while," said one UNO spokesperson
on a national television talk show a few months ago, "and now other people need these lands, so
it's time to take them away (from the cooperatives)." Shifting Alliances The new circumstances in
post-electoral Nicaragua produce strange bedfellows. Talk of an alliance between the ex-contras
and the pro-Sandinista peasants and rural workers, who in the 1980's were shooting it out, was
unimaginable just a few months ago. Yet in July former contra leaders held the first in ongoing
discussions with UNAG aimed at uniting peasants, irrespective of their political or ideological
leanings and past affiliations, around common class interests. In different parts of the country, local
UNAG branches have taken the initiative to try and mediate the land takeovers. The former contras
"are our class brothers, irrespective of the fact that they have been used by the United States," says
UNAG leader Daniel Nunez. The contras remain an organized force in Nicaraguan society. The
peasants of the Nicaragua Resistance operated as a proxy force for the United States and for the
traditional Nicaraguan elite in the campaign against the Sandinistas. The UNO extremists see them
as a new opportunity to once again utilize the peasantry as an instrument in their own agenda of
continued confrontation with the Sandinistas. Will the NR-OC now functions as a party defending
the class interests of its own base - poor peasants? Or will it act as proxy for the political interests of
other sectors? How the former contras and the NR-OC insert themselves into the complex mosaic
of realignments and redefinitions taking place in Nicaragua remains to be seen. The contradictions
generated by the revolutionary process and prolonged warfare effectively divided the Nicaraguan
peasantry as a class during the past 10 years. Now, the former contras are blending in with the
peasantry as a whole, a class whose identity is crystallizing in post- electoral Nicaragua. UNAG
and ATC warn that, overall, the Chamorro government's agrarian policies build pressures toward
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a reconcentration of land, that is, a return to the previous model of land tenure in Nicaragua.
That model helped generate the very pressures that led to revolution in the first place. The end
of the military conflict has not brought peace to Nicaragua; it has unleashed pent-up social and
economic tensions. The election and the transition, rather than stabilizing society, are resulting in a
realignment of social and economic actors in which the old conflicts are being replaced by new ones.

-- End --
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